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I. Introduction
Whether or not a monetary authority has an incentive for inﬂation has been the subject
of extensive literature. For example, the market power of monopolists imposes markups on
their product prices and induces policymakers to correct this distortion. The short term
trade-o# between inﬂation and output, if any, might induce a central banker to resort to an
expansionary policy. Moreover, in an open economy, when goods have closer substitutes
within a country than across countries, the monopoly power of the nation as a whole in the
world market will lead to its exploitation by the government.
Beyond these factors, this paper examines the e#ects of external wealth on the incentives
of policymakers. We determine that though a monetary authority is motivated to implement a
more expansionary policy, the possibility of a sales taxation can nullify such incentives.
The intuitive explanation of our ﬁnding is as follows. When a country is a net creditor at
the international level, its residents are not required to work extremely hard. A monetary
authority that oversees both the utility from consumption and the disutility from labor supply
implements the expansionary policy, and residents experience even higher consumption by
working harder. As a measure to eliminate such a monetary incentive, we entrust the ﬁscal
policy to attain an optimal level of economic activity, by introducing sales tax.
The ﬁndings of this paper are related to the following literature. Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001) showed that, with the producer-currency-pricing environment, the assumptions of
Cobb--Douglas Consumption indexes and a zero initial nonmonetary wealth always balance
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in subsequent periods. With regard to the corrective tax, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,
1999) proposed a method to eliminate markups resulting from the monopoly in a closed-
economy setting. In addition to such a market power, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) ﬁnd
the inﬂationary bias in an open-economy model with sticky prices. A method to nullify such
incentives was developed by Benigno and Benigno (2003), and Galı ÿand Monacelli (2005).
This paper replicates all of these features and ﬁnds that, beyond these factors, further
adjustment to tax/subsidy is required when the external wealth is not zero.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section II, we present the model framework.
In section III, we solve the model for monopolistically competitive equilibrium in a closed-
form. Section IV describes the problems of the monetary authorities. In section V, we describe
the tax policy. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. The Analytical Framework
The world consists of two countries, which are symmetric, except with respect to their
capital account positions. We refer to these countries as the home and foreign countries. All
agents in the private sector are consumer-producers, who we refer to as yeomen. Each yeoman
produces a di#erentiated good using his or her own labor, specializes in the production of a
single di#erentiated good, and is the only producer of that good. Production is demand
determined and because of markups over product prices, production levels would be below the
Pareto-optimal levels in the absence of active government intervention. Moreover, prices
would depart from the ex-post e$cient levels because yeomen are supposed to set their product
prices one period in advance. Yeomen inelastically supply products. All goods are tradable.
1. Yeoman
The lifetime utility function of a home yeoman of type h[0, n]a tt i m et is given by the




















where 0b1. Ct represents the overall consumption. Individuals supply labor to produce
their own goods and Lt denotes hours worked by this yeoman. The coe$cient F is constant.
The overall consumption, Ct, includes the bundle of home consumption goods CH, t and
the bundle of foreign consumption goods CF, t. The home (foreign) commodity aggregate CH, t
























































































































Pt is used for Ct; PH, t, for CH, t; and PF, t,f o rCF, t. Pf, t represents the home currency price of the
foreign good f, while P

f, t is its foreign currency price. Given these settings, individual h’s
demand for good h
 or f and the corresponding aggregates C
h

































































Foreign economic agents inhabit the interval (n, 1] and have identical preferences. The
symbol “*” is used to represent foreign variables; thus variables with a “*” symbol indicate
prices in foreign currency, consumption by foreign residents, and so on. For later use, let us
denote the world variable as a weighted average of domestic and foreign variables. For a





A home (foreign) economic agent of type h (f) produces a single di#erentiated good h









t denotes h’s labor input. At is a country-speciﬁc productivity shock. Foreign economic
agents have identical technology, except that the realization of foreign shock, namely A

t ,m a y
di#er ex-post.































where St expresses the home currency price of foreign currency; Ph, tY
h
t, the nominal income
derived from yeoman h’s production activity, which is taxed at the rate tt; and Tt represents a
nominal lump-sum tax per capita imposed by the domestic government.
A complete set of one-period nominal state contingent claims is available period by
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currencies. B(j)h, t1 represents a nominal contingent claim that pays the amount B(j)h, t1 in
the home currency only when the state j is realized at time t1. It is sold at time t for the price
q(j)t1. Similarly, B(j)f, t1 represents the foreign currency denominated contingent claim. We
assume perfect capital mobility and that the international claims arbitrage is perfect; thus, all
commodity trade imbalances are ﬁnanced by the international lending market. B
h
h, t1 denotes
net lending by (or borrowing from) the home yeoman h’, which is positive for borrowing from




h, t1 by deﬁnition. Similarly, B
f
h, t1 denotes the
net capital account position of the foreign yeoman f. In the following, we assume that, without
loss of generality, the home country is a net creditor.
Since these functions and budget constraints apply to all home yeomen, henceforth, we
omit the superscript h. The same applies for foreign yeomen. Parameters are the same in both
countries.
2. Government/Fiscal-Monetary Authority
The home government levies lump-sum taxes Tt and sales taxes at the rate of tt,o ni t s
residents, and the home government’s budget constraint is balanced in every period. When the
home residents’ per capita income from production is Ph, tYt, the home government’s budget
constraint is as follows:
ttPh, tYtTt0. (3)
The foreign authority faces a similar constraint. In the foreign country, the sales tax rate is t

t
and the lump-sum taxes are T

t .
We assume that each monetary authority controls the level of nominal expenditure of its






t . We interpret this ability as monetary control in a unit velocity
version of the quantity theory of money, though we are not explicit about the money demand
in this paper.
III. The Yeoman’s Optimization Problem
At time t, individuals choose the consumption level Ct, and home and foreign claims
holdings B(j)h, t1 and B(j)f, t1.L e tp(j) denote the probability that the state of nature is j in
the next period. Home agents face the following problem:
1
max
B(j)h, t1, B(j)f, t1
Ut s.t. (2)
and nonnegativity constraints on consumption Ct0. The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for
the home yeoman’s problem yields
1 For the intertemporal budget constraint, we require transversality conditions.
















for all t. Eq. (4) represents the price of contingent claim j in the home country at time t,
and eq. (5) presents the home resident’s evaluation of the price of foreign contingent claim j
at time t. Similarly, as a result of the foreign yeoman’s optimization, the price of foreign


















Home yeomen set product prices in the domestic market Ph, t in the currency of their own
country in advance at time t1. They set foreign currency prices P

ht so that P

htPh, t/St, once
St is revealed at time t. Since the total supply Yt is determined by the world demand C
W
h, t under
monopolistic competition, the goods market clearing implies
YtC
W
h, t.( 7 )
Consequently, the representative home agent faces the following problem at time t1:
max
Ph, t
Ut1 s.t. (1), (2), (7).






















Prices in each period are set to equate the marginal disutility associated with an additional unit
of labor input to the marginal utility from consumption. Eq. (8) indicates that the expected

































This equation indicates that a creditor country experiences lower work e#ort on average,
because the need to further enhance the income is low. The last term (n(1n)C

t /Ct)
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that the government potentially wants to target.
Analogous expressions apply to foreign goods.
1. The Equilibrium
In this subsection, we derive allocations and prices when yeomen consider governmental
policies to be exogenous.




st, government policy {cs, c
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st, and the initial value C0/C
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st, and prices {q(j)s1, q(j)

s1, Ss, Ph, s, P

h, s, Pf, s, P
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st that satisfy the yeoman’s
optimization problems, yeoman’s cost minimization when purchasing one unit of consumption
goods, the budget constraints of the yeoman and government, and goods market clearing
condition for all t, in each country.
Exchange Rate


























t /Ct). Thus, the determinants of exchange
rate can be decomposed into three parts: the monetary policy in the home country, the
monetary policy in the foreign country, and the consumption ratio.
When complete nominal asset markets exist, the levels of consumption are proportional
across countries provided the law of one price applies. To observe this, combine eqs. (5) and















Note that we have assumed that the probability assigned to state j, p(j), and the subjective
discount factor b are identical for all agents. Let C0/C

0a0. By substituting recursively, we














for all j, t






for all j, t
0. This indicates that the consumption ratio is constant over time.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June 0Consumption and Work E#ort
Consumption per capita and individual work e#ort can be written as functions of










































































































































































































































































































for t. Since the consumption preference is in logarithmic form, policy variables are
separable from the world aggregate demand relative to the consumption in the creditor
(home) country. In turn, the disutility from labor supply directly reﬂects C
W/C.
IV. Monetary Policy
In this section, we describe the monetary authority’s optimization problem and their
optimal policies ct and c

t . We assume each policymaker to be benevolent and as maximizing
his/her own residents’ consumption- and leisure-related utilities and ignore the direct utilities
from liquidity services. Policies are chosen at time t, subject to the restriction that behaviors
in private sectors are given by the equilibrium in Section 3.1. The private sector forms
expectations before policy makers set monetary rules, and therefore, authorities have an
incentive to re-optimize their policies in the following period.
The optimal policies must satisfy the following:










































































for all t. These policy functions show that if the ﬁscal policy did not eliminate monopo-
listic distortions, we would expect expansionary as well as contractionary incentives to
monetary authorities. In particular, a provides the expansionary incentive for the monetary
policy in the home country in order to o#set the private sector’s incentive for low production.
On the other hand, the reduction in production tax tt limits surprise expansion.
We consider a method to eliminate these monetary incentives in the next section.
V. Corrective Tax Policies
We consider a situation where the sales tax policy is aimed to correct distortions and
externalities. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) proposed the single-country models
wherein tax-subsidy policies cancel out monopolistic distortions. In a two-country model,
other factors emerge that would be subject to governmental control.















































































































Each policy maker determines its tax rule independently to maximize the utility of the
residents of its own country, given the private sector’s allocation and pricing rules. In such a
case, the government sets the tax rate so that










for all t. Since the parameters on the right-hand side are assumed to be time invariant,
these tax rates are also constant over time. The policy in the home country depends on three
factors.
First, a government o#sets the markup q/(q1) by decreasing the tax rate.
2 Second, as
the share of home goods n increases, the ﬁscal tax increases.
3 Third, in a country whose
external wealth position is one of surplus, the tax policy tends to be low.
There are three factors that derive the policy in the foreign country. As in the home
country, q/(q1) reduces the tax rate and (1n) increases it. In addition, 1/(na1n) also
increases the tax rate because the foreign country is a net debtor.
Given these rates of sales taxes, the inﬂationary/deﬂationary bias disappears in equilib-
rium.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have demonstrated that, in the presence of external wealth, labor supply
is not high enough, from the viewpoint of the government in a creditor country. This motivates
the monetary authority to create a surprise expansion.
The sales tax is e#ective to eliminate such an ill e#ect of wealth, both under a sticky-price
as well as ﬂexible-price economy. Under a sticky-price environment, the optimal sales tax
works to eliminate a bias of discretionary monetary policy.
For future research, we plan to relax the complete market assumption. An indebted
country may well have an incentive to utilize an unexpected expansion to devalue their
external debt, which would be possible if the pricing of bonds is not e$cient. This is not
possible in our model because the international ﬁnancial market is complete and the purchasing
power parity holds, and thus, the risk of the real value of external debt is shared across
countries. The alteration of a government’s incentive under an incomplete market and the
implications for national welfare in light of the ﬁnancial structure are interesting issues.
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